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ARGUMENT
The brief of Plaintiffs and Appellees S&W Construction
Company ("S&W") and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's
Fund") ("Plaintiffs") demonstrates that the trial court's award
of $377,310.00 to Plaintiffs should be reversed.

The only

support for the award offered by their brief consists of two
fictitious agreements never found to exist even by the trial
court itself.
Under the construction contract between S&W and
Defendant and Appellant Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company
("Cyprus-Thompson Creek"), the amount that should be awarded to
Plaintiffs for S&W' s predefault work is $129, 957. 73.

No

prejudgment interest should be awarded on this amount, and none
should have been included in the original judgment because the
, parties were never able to calculate the underlying amounts with
any precision.
There is no legal or equitable justification for the
trial court' s award of post-judgment interest at the Idaho
statutory rate of eighteen percent.

The judgment should bear

interest at the Utah statutory rate of twelve percent.

1.

Plaintiffs'

b r i e f d e m o n s t r a t e s that, t h e Judgment

parfl nf 6 3 7 7 . 3 1 0 t o fi&W was nnt s u p p o r t e d bv t h e

nnnstruction

Qntract*
Plaintiffs seek to support the trial court' s award of
377, 310. 00 to S&W based upon an agreement which did not exist.
'he nature and terms of this supposed agreement are stated on
>age 21 of their brief:
. . . an agreement was reached whereby
S&W delegated its duties and transferred it
[sic] subcontracts to Fireman's Fund. This
left the S&W contract in place and kept the
network of subcontractors on the job.
This assertion of a "delegation agreement" by S&W is
erroneous for the following reasons:
1.

No such agreement ever existed, and none was found

to exist by the trial court;
2.

The clear contract language governing S&W' s rights

upon its default contradicts any such supposed delegation
agreement.%
The delegation agreement theory as found in Plaintiffs'
brief is an invention.

The trial court clearly found no such

agreement; it is not even referred to in any of the thirty-one
findings of fact and five conclusions of law entered by the trial
court.

(See Addendum F to Appellants' Brief).

This supposed "delegation agreement" also ignores and
contradicts the clear contract language which would otherwise
govern any recovery for S&W after its default.

That language is

found in Section 43. 3 of the Contract Agreement (Addendum I to
Appellants' Brief) between S&W and Cyprus-Thompson Creek, where
S&W' s recovery is clearly and explicitly limited to work done
prior to the default:
In the event of any such default,
defect, delay, bankruptcy, or insolvency,
CONTRACTOR shall not be entitled to any
further payment until the matter is remedied
to the satisfaction of COMPANY and then shall
be paid only such amount as is reasonably due
for WORK properly done by CONTRACTOR . . . .
In an apparent attempt to avoid the clear import of
this language, Plaintiffs substitute their theory of a delegation
agreement.

To support this theory, they suggest obliquely that

the delegation agreement is supported by the fact that Cyprus Thompson Creek never terminated its contract with S&W.

While it

is true that Cyprus-Thompson Creek never terminated the contract,
this fact is irrelevant.

The language of Section 43. 3 says

nothing about limiting S&W' s recovery to payment for work done
prior to contract termination.

In fact, the contract provisions

upon which Plaintiffs rely to support their argument that
termination is somehow relevant to this case undercut their
argument.

Sections 43.1 and 43.2 give Cyprus-Thompson Creek

arious options in the event of S&W's default.

Cyprus-Thompson

reek could terminate the contract if it so chooses.

It could

lso proceed in other, alternate ways to remedy the default.
owever, Section 43. 3 makes clear that S&W' s recovery is limited
o payment for work it did prior to its default, regardless of
.he remedy elected by Cyprus-Thompson Creek.

Since S&W did no

rork after default, it is entitled to no recovery beyond payment
:or its predefault work.
The theory of a delegation agreement also ignores the
:lear undisputed evidence at trial.

All parties agree that, upon

5&W' s default, the critical concern was insuring continuity of
the construction work on the project.

The key consideration in

insuring such continuity was to keep the subcontractors working
on the job.

To do so, Cyprus-Thompson Creek and its contract

manager, Morrison-Knudsen, hired S&W supervisory personnel who
had been .terminated by S&W because of the bankruptcy.

The

paperwork, including the administration of the various
subcontractors, was done in a way as to avoid any disruption of
the work because of S&W' s default.
disputed.

None of these facts are

See, e. a. , Brief of Appellees' at 21.

However--and

this is the important point—this effort to insure construction
continuity did not result in any agreement by any party to the
substitution of another contractor for S&W or to the delegation

of any of S&W s contractual duties.

Because the only possible

support for the trial court7 s award to S&W is this non-existent
agreement, the award should be reversed.
2.

Plaintiffs' brief, and the table of calculations

included therein, demonstrate that the proper amount of an award

to S&W for work done prior to default is £129,957,73Defendants and Appellants Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining
Company and Cyprus Minerals Company ("Cyprus") submit that
$129,957.73 is the proper amount to be awarded to S&W for the
work it did prior to its default.

Plaintiffs assert that

$295,079.73 represents the correct figure for the value of work
done prior to default, though this is not the amount they are
seeking to recover.

The trial court agreed with this figure in

its Finding of Fact No. 27.

(Addendum F to Appellants' Brief).

The $295,079.73 figure is derived by deducting
$1,162,921.00, the amount all parties agree Cyprus-Thompson Creek
paid to S&W subcontractors and suppliers after default, from the
sum of $1,458,000.73, the total of progress payment estimates
submitted by S&W but not paid prior to its default.
Cyprus submits that $165,122.00 should be deducted from
the $1,458,000.73 claimed by S&W on the progress payment
estimates before deduction of the $1,162,921.00 figure for
amounts paid to S&W subcontractors by Cyprus-Thompson Creek after

*fault.

Since the $165,122, 00 represents work not actually done

{ S&W prior to default, this amount should be deducted from the
rogress payment estimates' total.
To understand this conclusion, it is necessary to
nderstand precisely what the $165, 122. 00 figure represents,
hat figure was included in the progress payment estimates under
category called "material advances."

Cyprus-Thompson Creek

ave material advances to S&W for work which had not yet been
one; advances were paid to insure that S&W had adequate funds to
>ay for equipment which needed to be ordered in advance and
iabricated to specification.

The $165,122.00 was for specialized

leating and air conditioning equipment being supplied by an S&W
subcontractor, McGee Heating & Air Conditioning.
The testimony by all parties at trial was clear and
undisputed.

S&W claimed credit for this $165,122.00 in the

progress payment estimates totalling $1,458,000. 77.

S&W did not,

however, pay this amount; Cyprus did after default.
At page 30 of their brief, Plaintiffs set forth a table
which purports to demonstrate that the deduction of the
$165,122.00 is irrelevant to the computation of the correct
amount to be awarded to S&W for work done prior to default.
table shows:

That

Prg-flgfowlt Profits

gre-flefovlt Profits

Including Units

pyclyiflinq Pnjt?

Amount Earned:

$1,458,000.73

$1,292,878.73

Less S&W
Obligations
Due Subs and
Suppliers at
Insolvency:
1, 1 » , 9?l,QQ
Pre-Insolvency
Profit:

$

997.799.00

295,079.73

$

295,079.73

The first problem with the table is that it purports to
show the "profits" earned by S&W.

Profits are irrelevant.

Section 43. 3 of the contract does not grant S&W any right to
recover profits for work done prior to default.

Under Section

4 3. 3, S&W is only entitled to recover the value of the work it
actually did prior to default.
There are five separate numbers shown in the table.
The first is $1,458,000.73.
Earned."

This amount is labeled as "Amount

This label is incorrect.

This number actually

represents the total of the unpaid progress payment estimates at
the time of default.

The next number to the right of

$1,292,878.73 represents the progress payment estimates' total of
$1,458,000.73 minus $165,122.00 in material advances.

This

number is correct in the sense that it represents the total
amount due for work actually done by S&W and its subcontractors

rior to default.

This number is, however, incorrectly labeled

3 "Amount Earned. "

This label is wrong again because of the

Bxt figure in the left column of the table; that figure is
1,162,921.00, the amount Cyprus-Thompson Creek paid S&W s
ubcontractors and suppliers after default.

Obviously, any

mounts paid by Cyprus-Thompson Creek for S&W obligations must be
educted to obtain the "amount earned" by S&W.

The $1,162,921.00

igure is the correct amount for the S&W obligations Cyprus'hompson Creek paid.
The next figure to the right is $997, 799. 00; it is
.ncorrect.

This figure is wrong because the assumption upon

/hich the table is premised is also wrong.

The table is only a

:ortuous attempt to demonstrate an otherwise simple proposition;
$165,122.00 should not be deducted from the amount claimed as due
for work done at the time of default.

The argument to support

this proposition is premised on a faulty conclusion summarized on
page 29 of Plaintiffs' brief as follows:
Robs on [Fireman's Fund's expert witness]
testified that the subcontracts required S&W
to pay suppliers and subcontractors only
after payment from Cyprus. . . . Thus, the
question of when to account for the units is
a fictitious issue.
The issue is not one of accounting for payments made to
subcontractors and suppliers.

The issue is a legal question of

S&W' s entitlement to payment under the contract language.

The

timing of payment for the equipment represented by the material
advances is not a "fictitious issue," because the clear language
of Section 43. 3 which determines S&W s right to any payment
following default states that any such payment is limited to work
properly done by S&W prior to that default.

Thus, S&W s

entitlement to any monies depends upon work which it actually did
prior to the time it walked off the project in May of 1983.
Under this contract language, the correct computation
is as follows:

$165,122.00 should be deducted from 1,458,000.73.

This deduction should be made because the advance was only a
credit given on the progress payment estimate for work to be done
in the future.

This deduction yields $1,292,878*73, a figure

representing the actual value of the work completed at the time
of default.

From this figure should be subtracted the

$1,162,921.00 which represents the amount of S&W s obligations
paid by Cyprus-Thompson Creek.

The resulting figure is

$129,957. 73, the amount still due to S&W under Section 43. 3 for

le value of the work it had performed at the time of default. l
tius, S&W is not entitled to recover any more than $129, 957. 73
or its work prior to default.
3.

Plaintiff a' brief demonstrate that the award of

377.310 to Fireman' s Fund was based on an agyeetnftnt which did

Qt exist
At page 35 of their brief, Plaintiffs assert the
ollowing contract:
The effect of this correspondence was
the formation of a contract between S&W and
Fireman's Fund. The letter of June 24, 1983
from Fireman' s Fund to Cyprus constitutes an
offer. The letter of June 29, 1983 from
Cyprus constitutes a counteroffer which was
accepted by Fireman' s Fund. Cyprus' response
set forth in its "Item (i)" is most
reasonably construed as a proposal to pay all
excess contract funds to Fireman' s Fund upon
l

When properly calculated according to the contract language,
Plaintiffs' table should read:
Amount of Progress Payment Estimates
Less:

Deduction for Material Advances
Credited Before Work was Done
Subtotal

Less:

S&W Obligations Paid by CyprusThompson Creek After Default

Total Amount Earned by S&W
Prior to Default

$1,458,000.73
165,122.00
1, 292, 878. 73
1,162,921.00

129, 957. 73

counsel' s advice that such an arrangement is
legally possible. Fireman' s Fund accepted
this term in its letter of August 12, 1983.
Plaintiffs assert that there was an agreement,
contained in three letters, two in June and one in August of
1983.

Presumably, the effect of this alleged agreement was to

bind Cyprus-Thompson Creek to pay any excess contract funds to
Fireman' s Fund.
There was simply no agreement of the kind now advanced
by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs acknowledge this fact.

They admit at

pages 33 through 36 of their brief that Cyprus-Thompson Creek and
Fireman' s Fund never agreed to a proposal that Fireman' s Fund be
obligated to pay amounts in excess of the bond limit.

Fireman' s

Fund dismisses this problem with the statement, "The bond limit
was only an issue if costs overruns exceeded the bond limit. "
Brief of Appellees at 36.

This statement is a concession that no

agreement was ever reached on the point.

The concession is

explained away by the irrelevant and unsupported legal assertion
that the eventuality which the disputed point was supposed to
cover never occurred.
There was, however, another term on which no agreement
was reached, and this term is rather disingenuously omitted from
Plaintiffs' argument.

Cyprus-Thompson Creek proposed, as a

further condition to any agreement to pay the contract balances,
-11 -

lat Fireman' s Fund give it a hold harmless agreement to protect
fprus-Thompson Creek in the event of third party claims to the
irplus funds.

Fireman' s Fund never agreed to this point.

The omission of this point from Plaintiffs' argument is
•trticularly noteworthy because in June of 1984, Fireman' s Fund,
tirough its present counsel, sent a letter to Cyprus-Thompson
reek demanding the contract surplus and offering a hold harmless
greement.

This letter was admitted as Exhibit 38-P at trial,

nd is attached as Addendum A to this reply brief.

Obviously,

his letter came long after completion of the work and long after
ny supposed agreement arose from correspondence in June and
ugust of 1983.
Again, it should be noted that in its rather lengthy
.nd often detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
:rial court did not find any such agreement.

(See Addendum F to

appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs also seem to argue that under an equitable
:heory of subrogation, Fireman' s Fund is entitled to the surplus
contract balance.

However, as is revealed at page 36 of their

Drief, this argument is also premised upon the supposed agreement
that Cyprus-Thompson Creek would pay the contract surplus to
Fireman' s Fund.

As stated, this agreement simply did not exist.

As

noted above, neither the findings of fact nor the conclusions of
law entered by the trial court support the existence of this
claimed agreement.

The findings of fact do, however, suggest a

serious failure in Plaintiffs' case, a failure which may explain
Plaintiffs' need to invoke a non-existent agreement.

Finding of

Fact No. 4 (Addendum F to Appellants' Brief) states Fireman' s
Fund' s obligations under the performance bond upon the default of
S&W.
4. The performance bond required
Fireman' s Fund, upon default by S&W, to
promptly:
1. Complete the contract in
accordance with the terms of the
contract, or
2. Obtain bids for completing the
contract in accordance with the said
terms and conditions of the contract and
make available sufficient funds to pay
for such completion.
Fireman' s Fund performed neither of the alternatives
set forth in Finding of Fact No. 4.

It did not hire a substitute

contractor nor did it complete the work.

It did not pay the

expenses of completing the job; Cyprus did.

Neither at trial nor

in their brief have Plaintiffs made any attempt to argue that
Fireman' s Fund followed either of these alternatives.

Since

Fireman' s Fund did not perform in accordance with the terms of
-13-

:s bond, Plaintiffs must resort to a non-existent contract to
xpport the asserted obligation of Cyprus-Thompson Creek to pay
le contract balance to Fireman' s Fund.

Because the trial

>urt' s award to Fireman' s Fund can only be based on this noncistent agreement, it should be reversed.
4.

Contrary to the mlscharacterization of its

raument in Plaintiffs' brief. Cyprus seeks reversal of the prendyment interest award because the underlying judgment amount

as not mathematically ascertainable.
Plaintiffs misstate Cyprus1 argument on this point;
yprus does not seek reversal of the prejudgment interest award
ecause the amount of damages was disputed.

It seeks reversal of

he award because the parties were never able to calculate a
recise amount.

£$& Insurance Assoc. Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho

48, 782 P.2d 1230, 1233 (1989).
The present case is distinguishable in several
.mportant* respects from the case relied on most heavily by
>laintiffs, Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 506 P. 2d 455
[1972).

First, there is no indication that the parties in

4itchell had any difficulty in ascertaining the amount due under
:he contracts.

Second, the judgment in Mitchell was not based on

a stipulated amount.
iefault.

Third, the contractor in Mitchell did not

Fourth, there is no indication that a contract
-14-

provision at all similar to Section 43. 3 governed the amount due
in Mitchell.2

The amount of damages was stipulated in the

present case because that amount was not otherwise calculable.
This crucial fact is not altered by Plaintiffs' explanations for
the stipulation; their explanations are irrelevant and
implausible.

Plaintiffs' claim that the stipulation could have

been reached earlier through timely discussions is meaningless.
An earlier stipulation would still be a stipulation.

Plaintiffs'

suggestion that they lacked the documents needed to calculate the
amount due is implausible given their claims of intimate
involvement in the completion of the contract work and their
claims of accuracy for their various calculations.

Even more

implausible is Plaintiffs' assertion that they stipulated to
Cyprus' figure only because it would be more economical to forego
their claim for an additional $20,000 than to offer a few change
orders as evidence at trial.

Because the underlying amount was

not ascertainable with any precision, the trial court' s award of
prejudgment interest should be reversed.

2

Section 43.3 provides for payment of "only such amount as is
reasonably due for WORK properly done by CONTRACTOR. " It does not
provide a liquidated sum as did the contracts in Mitchell.
-1 q_

5.

The contract' s choice of law provision does not

Btifv the trial court's award of post-iudpment interest at the

Bho rate of eighteen percent.
As all parties to this appeal have agreed, the
ndatory rate of post-judgment interest set by section 15-1-4 of
e Utah Code applies to all judgments rendered by Utah courts,
less the parties to the contract have agreed on another rate,
aintiffs suggest at pages 46 through 49 of their brief that the
rial court' s award should stand because the parties did agree on
le Idaho statutory rate. 3

The only contract provision cited in

lpport of this theory is Section 38. 1. 7, a general choice of law
rovision that makes no reference to interest.
Section 38. 1. 7 was not and cannot be considered an
jreement on the applicable post-judgment interest rate.

Such

rovisions are understood to refer only to the substantive law
overning the merits of disputes under the contract.

3 National

nstitute of Construction Law, Construction & Design Law § 35. 2,
t 3 (1984)("In general, a choice of law provision will not
ffect the procedural aspects of a case, which remain subject to
3

Plaintiffs have also noted that a Utah trial court may under
jertain circumstances impose an interest rate higher than the
statutory rate for equitable reasons. However, Plaintiffs have
>ffered no equitable reason for imposing a higher rate in this
:ase.
Absent an equitable reason or a legal reason, i.e., a
:ontract provision specifying a higher rate of interest, there is
10 basis for the trial court' s post-judgment interest award.

the law of the forum."); S^ars. Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assoc, ,
Inc. , 43 N. Y. 2d 389, 372 N. E. 2d 555, 559, 401 N. Y. S. 2d 767
(1977)("The contract provision that the agreement was to be
governed by Michigan law operated only to import the substantive
law of Michigan.").

Under this rule, the meaning of Section

38. 1. 7 is not at all ambiguous; in accordance with the
established rule, it states the parties' choice of substantive
law only.
Although Plaintiffs would like this Court to classify
post-judgment interest as substantive, they have failed to offer
a single policy reason for doing so.

They have also failed to

cite even one instance of another court' s having adopted their
position.

Instead, they have quoted Transpower Constructors v.

Grand River Dam Auth. . to the effect that post-judgment interest
11

fait best, . . . is

x

" in the uncertain area between substance

and procedure"' and, therefore, *"rationally capable of
classification as either."'"

905 F. 2d 1413, 1424 (10th Cir.

1990)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).

In quoting this

portion of the case, Plaintiffs have chosen to ignore the court' s
holding:

"We disagree with [defendant's] characterization of

[post-judgment] interest on fees as substantive. . . .

we

conclude that . . . the imposition of [post-judgment] interest on
fees is a procedural matter. "

Ifl.
_ 1 T_

Absent any legal authority or

>licy reason for classifying post-judgment interest as
ibstantive, this Court should follow the reasoning of the courts
lat have already considered this issue and have determined that
:>st-judgment interest should be classified as procedure.
Just as Section 38. 1. 7 could not justify the use of
laho' s civil procedure rules in a Utah court, it cannot justify
tie application of Idaho' s post-judgment interest rate to a Utah
udgment. 4

Any other conclusion would be manifestly unfair.

It

ould simply provide a windfall to Plaintiffs that was never
ontemplated by the parties to the contract.

Given the rule that

irovisions such as Section 38. 1. 7 state the parties' choice of
ubstantive law only and given the case law establishing that
>ost-judgment interest is a procedural matter, there is no basis
for concluding that Section 38. 1. 7 was intended to provide for
jost-judgment interest at the Idaho rate.

Therefore, the trial

sourt' s imposition of post-judgment interest at the rate of
eighteen percent should be reversed.

se^ Ajrgp, inc, 2L Hprxspp Cftrgp Transport, tnct *

66

Haw

-

590, 670 P. 2d 1277, 1281 (1983)(supreme court reversed trial
court' s award of prei udament interest based on Hawaii law because
contract provided that Texas law governed, but supreme court said
nothing about post-judgment interest even though trial court must
have concluded that Hawaii law governed that rate as well).

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' brief demonstrates that this Court should
reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment as
follows:

Plaintiffs should be awarded judgment in the amount of

$129,057.73.

No prejudgment interest should be included.

Post-

judgment interest at the prescribed Utah statutory rate of twelve
percent per annum should accrue from the date of entry of this
Court' s judgment.
Any award in excess of the amount urged here could only
be based on a misinterpretation of the contract language
governing S&W s recovery, dubious legal theories substituted for
that contract language, acceptance of an unsupported equitable
argument that Fireman' s Fund is entitled to the contract balance
on a job completed and paid for by Cyprus, and misinterpretations
of the legal standards governing prejudgment and post-judgment
interest.

-1 Q -

DATED this /ffA day of October, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Kenneth W. Yeates
Phyllis J. Vetter
Attorneys for Appellants
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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Frank M i s c l e v i t z
Box 645
Challis, Idaho 83226
Re:

CO

Claim No, HI'
Bond No, SC
Principal^: $*~ir*ff Const. Co. of Tennessee, Inc.
Obligee: " Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company
Project: Cyprus-Thompson Creek Phases 7, 12 & 17

Dear Mr. Misclevitz:
Fireman's Fund hereby makes a demand for the balance
of approximately $300,000 in the captioned project. This
demand is based upon an agreement between Fireman1s Fund
and Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company in June 1983 which
is embodied in letters dated June 24*, 1983 and June 29, 1983
between Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining Company and Fireman's
Fund, copies of which are enclosed.
You will note that on page 2 of the June 24 letter
Fireman's Fund requests in paragraph (i) that "all the
contract balances less completion costs incurred by McrriscnKnudsen Company shall be paid to Fireman's Fund." In response,
on page 2 of the June 29 letter Cyprus-Thompson Creek states
that "prior to the release of any S & W funds we would require
thac Fireman's Fund provide us a document that holds Cyprus
Thompson Creek and Morrison-Knudsen harmless frcrz any subsequent claims from these funds."
Pursuant to the request in the June 29 letter, Fireman's Fund hereby agrees to hold Cyprus-Thompson Creek Mining
Company and Morrison-Knudsen harmless from any subsequent
claims for these funds. Fireman's Fund hereby requests that
these funds be paid to it immediately.
Thank you for vour assistance.
Very^truly yours,

DMH:ms
Enclosure

Denton M. Hatch
Attorney for Fireman's Fund
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